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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
F. W I L L I A M McGINN II,
Plaintiff-R espondent,

UTAH POWER & LIGHT
C O M P A N Y , a Maine corporation
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13619

Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff when the mast of a sailboat he and four
others were carrying into Bear Lake came in contact
with one of defendant's electric power lines resulting in
substantial burns and other injuries to plaintiff.

D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT
After a five day jury trial, and upon special verdict, the jury found that both the plaintiff and de1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendant were negligent but the plaintiff's negligence
was 60 percent responsible for the accident whereas the
defendant contributed 40 percent to the accident. The
lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action
and subsequently granted plaintiff's motion for new
trial on alternative grounds.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the order granting a
new trial and reinstatement of the judgment of no
cause of action.
Plaintiff, (and cross-appellant), seeks first that the
trial court's order granting a new trial be affirmed and,
in the alternative, that this court grant a new trial on
the additional grounds raised by way of cross-appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 23, 1972, F . William McGinn I I was
electrocuted and burned while carrying a sailboat across
an open beach with friends on the north shore of
Bear Lake in Bear Lake County, Idaho. The unmarked
beach across which Mr. McGinn and his friends were
carrying the boat was owned by Utah Power and Light
Company. To its immediate north is a county road
which runs along the north shore past a Utah Power
and Light pumping station called Camp Lifton and an
Idaho State Park.
2
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The beach where the accident occurred west of the
Camp Lifton pumping station has other characteristics
which make it a desirable recreation area, despite the
presence of the three power lines described at length by
defendant-appellant in its brief. The water is shallow
(R. 538), the beach itself is composed of gently rolling
sand dunes covered with annual grass (R. 539), and
it is generally a "nice family area," "a particularly appealing area for young families with young children."
(R. 538-539). There were no signs or fencing or any
other form of warning indicating high tension wires or
indicating no trespassing (R. 542). The beach has been
regularly used for recreation for years, particularly on
J u l y 4th and 24th (R. 178). Based on the evidence the
court found as a matter of law that plaintiff was not a
trespasser at the time and place of the accident (R.
815).
Although the members of the p a r t y were aware of
the 230,000 volt line on the north side of the road, they
were not aware of the smaller 46,000 volt line where the
accident occurred (R. 626, 651, 640). W h e n the mast
of the boat struck the power line M r . McGinn was
shocked, he fell to the ground stunned with no pulse
or breathing (R. 588, 589). H e immediately caught
fire (R. 638). F r o m the burns which he received,
both from the power lines and from the fire, M r . McGinn suffered burns over thirty percent of his body
surface (R. 484). H e had a serious electrical burn on
the right flank and another on the left foot. H i s chest,
right arm, groin and both legs were covered with second
and third degree burns. Following all treatment M r .
3
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McGinn, characterized by the surgeon who treated him
as being an exceptionally successful case (R. 523),
lost four toes, suffered considerable scarring (R. 521)
and has a substantial surface of his body covered with
skin grafts which will always be slow in healing, highly
sensitive to extreme temperatures, susceptible to
trauma which will require new skin grafts, and otherwise provide physical limitations for plaintiff for the
rest of his life (R. 591-594). In addition, plaintiff will
be susceptible to thrombophlebitis (R. 501) and cataracts (R. 505). In addition to his lost wages of $4,797.37 (Ex. I I P , 72P) plaintiff, Mr. McGinn, was
forced to give up his planned career in the National
Guard with the resulting loss of future income of
somewhere between $40,172.26 to $88,487.28 (Ex. 73P,
74P).
The focus of this appeal is not the merits of the
case but rather the procedures by which the case was
submitted to the jury and subsequently a new trial was
granted. Therefore, although a brief summary of facts
of the case is given as a supplement to those facts presented in appellant's brief, a greater emphasis should
be placed upon the precedural aspects of the case.
As pointed out by Appellant this case was tried
under the Idaho Comparative Negligence Statute.
However, of course, it was tried under Utah procedural
law. The trial judge ruled that no instructions would
be given to the jury concerning the effect of their decision on percentage of negligence and further, the
court prohibited any argument or mention of percentages in closing argument (R. 817).
4
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The jury returned a verdict finding defendant,
Utah Power and Light Company, forty percent negligent and plaintiff, F . William McGinn I I , sixty percent negligent. The jury also assessed $150,000.00 general damages and $18,150.00 special damages. Following entry of judgment plaintiff filed a motion for a
judgment not withstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial.
The motion for a new trial was based upon defects in the issuance of special interrogatories and errors
of law committed in the judge's direction on argument
before the jury. In support of that motion plaintiff
filed an extensive brief and, in addition, filed affidavits
of five jurors indicating there was substantial confusion
concerning the meaning and effect of the special interrogatories which confusion resulted in significant error
by the jury. Trial Judge Marcellus K. Snow granted
the Motion for a New Trial on two alternative grounds.
The first ground was that the jury should have been
advised of the results of their percentage findings
through appropriate instructions and argument of
counsel. The alternative ground which the court found
to be a sufficient independent reason for granting a
new trial was that the jurors were not sufficiently instructed as to the relationship, or lack of relationship,
between the percentage findings and damages regardless of the instruction received as to the legal meaning
of the percentages. The judge indicated in the ruling
that the affidavits of jurors had no substantial affect
upon the order granting a new trial. It is from this
5
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order granting a new trial that defendant appealed and
it is in light of the propriety of that order that the
appeal should be judged.

INTRODUCTORY

STATEMENT

As the Court is perhaps aware, the instant case was
the first case ever tried in the State of Utah involving
an application of comparative negligence, with the exception, of course, of numerous F E L A cases which have
been processed through the courts of this State and
which involve a concept of so-called "complete comparative negligence". During the course of the trial several issues arose which were issues of first impression in
this State. Only one of those was the issue of "blindfolding" the jury which is discussed extensively in the
Appellant's Brief and which will be discussed in Point
I hereinafter. Other issues, equally critical, and before
this Court either by way of the appeal, or the cross
appeal, include instructions to be given to the jury regarding the percentage findings and damages as well
as the sphere of permissible argument on the percentages.
I t is the position of plaintiff that this Court should
resolve all of these issues of first impression and, after
resolving the same, should remand the case for a new
trial in accordance with the ruling of the trial court,
6
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with the guidance of this Court on the various issues.
A dismissal of this case, by this Court, would result in
substantial prejudice to the plaintiff whose principle
dilemma is that his case happened to be the first comparative negligence case tried in this jurisdiction.

POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R I N
GRANTING P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION FOR
N E W TRIAL.
We preface this discussion by noting that the
granting or denying of a new trial is essentially a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Steven Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 Pac. 867
(1886):
Motions for new trial are always addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, and whether
graned or denied, the discretion of the trial court
will be presumed to have been properly exercised
unless the contrary may be made clearly to appear .(4 Utah 327 at 329, 9 Pac. 867 at 869).
The Appellant seems to have forgotten, in its Brief,
that the Motion and Order for new trial were in the
alternative. Appellant would lead this Court to believe
that the only issue presented and resolved was whether
or not the jury should be "blindfolded". To the contrary, the Motion for New Trial itself, in addition to
other grounds, was framed in the alternative as follows:
7
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There was error of law committed by the trial
court in failing to instruct the jury as to the consequences of their special verdict findings and, in
the alternative, in failing to submit special interrogatories in such a fashion as to not mislead the
jury. (R. 45, Emphasis added).
Likewise, in argument before the trial court on the
Motion for New Trial, following argument on the
"blindfolding" issue, the alternative ground for new
trial was argued whereby plaintiff sought more specific
instructions on the relationship between the percentages
and the damages such as those given in Wisconsin (see
R. 930), and also seeking more liberality in terms of
argument. (R. 931). In concluding argument on this
point counsel made it clear that the request for new
trial was in the alternative:
. . . grant a new trial either on the theory that
we tell them, or if we don't tell them, give them
more instruction so that we can at least eliminate
some of these problems that we have discussed.
The order of the trial court, granting the new trial,
was likewise phrased in the alternative. The court first
found that a new trial should be granted on the ground
that:
In comparative negligence cases the jury should
be advised of the results of their percentage findings through appropriate instructions and argument of counsel. (Para 3 at R. 16)
The Court continued:
4. Alternatively, and in all events, the Court is
of the opinion that substantial justice has not

8
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been done in the present case. The jurors were
not sufficiently instructed as to the relationship,
or lack of relationship, between the percentage
findings and the damages. Therefore, even if the
jury is not told the legal meaning of the percentages, it should be more specifically instructed on
how to answer the interrogatiories. The jury
should be advised and instructed specifically that
there is no relationship between the damage
answer and the percentages. (R. 16)
Although Appellant has argued at length about the
"blindfolding question", it has not addressed itself whatsoever to the alternative holding of the trial court as
set forth above regarding appropriate instructions.
In this point, we will discuss both grounds for the
new trial and in the remaining points of the brief we
shall discuss the points on cross-appeal.
A. The jury should be advised of the effect of its
percentage findings.
An issue presented by the appeal, among others, is
whether in instructing the jury and allowing argument
to the jury, the trial court should either inform them or
allow counsel to inform them that a finding of the
plaintiff's negligence being greater than that of the
defendant will defeat recovery by the plaintiff.
It is important that the Court, in grappling with
the problem, be fully aware that the question is entirely
open. That is, this matter is not controlled by the Idaho
case law nor is it necessarily resolved by reference to
another State such as Wisconsin. The question pre9
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sented is a philosophical one, touching rather fundamental concepts, which ought properly to be resolved
by each State in accordance with its own traditions and
philosophy.
The law of Utah rather than the law of Idaho is
controlling on matters regarding the submission of the
case to the jury.
Perhaps the most fundamental error committed by
the Power Company in its Brief is the assumption that
Idaho law, rather than Utah law, is controlling on the
question of whether or not the jury should be blindfolded.1 Appellant simply ignores the fundamental
choice of law question inherent in this matter — in considering how the jury is to be instructed does the law
of the forum (Utah) or the law of the lex loci (Idaho)
apply?
The law is settled beyond reasonable argument that
such a question should be governed by the law of Utah
rather than that of the law of Idaho. 2 W e start with
the general proposition that the procedural laws of the
forum are to apply rather than those of the place of
the tort. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 245, 166 P.2d
205 (1946). I t is also quite clear that the method of
submission to the jury and the form of verdict are "procedural" rather than substantive in this context. See,
for example, Section 127, American Law Institute, Re1 See, for example, the assertion at page 16 of Appellants Brief
to the effect that "Holland v. Petersen, the Idaho Comparative
Negligence Case . . . is controlling in this case."
2 This matter was briefed in the lower court — see R 63, 64.

10
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statement of the Law of Conflict
which states t h a t :

of Laws 2nd (1971)

The local law of the forum governs rules of
pleading and the conduct of proceedings in

Court.
I n a comment to that general proposition, there is an
elaboration stating t h a t :
The local law of the forum governs, among
other things, the following matters: . . . the form
of verdict and judgment.
Analogously, the Federal Courts have held in diversity
cases that State law regarding the relative function of
j u d g e and j u r y should not be applied, but that the F e d eral law on that subject is controlling as it is "procedural". F o r example, in Mississippi Power <§ Light
Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir. 1934),
the Court observed:
Section 511 of Mississippi Code of 1930 provides that the negligence of the person injured
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall
be diminished by the j u r y in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to him. Section 512 is that all questions of negligence and
contributory negligence shall be for the j u r y to
determine. W e agree with appellant's contention that the latter section is not binding in a
federal court, but deals with the functions of
j u d g e and j u r y as to which federal courts have
their own organization and as to which state law
is without effect.
Therefore, while Idaho's substantive law applies
in this case, (i.e. the law of comparative negligence),
11
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Utah is free to apply its own procedural law and to
decide for itself the nature of the relationship between
judge and jury. The assumption of the Power Company that Idaho law is "controlling" is palpably
erroneous.
THE

CONTROVERSEY

The basic question — "should the jury be blindfolded?" is far more simply stated than resolved. There
is respectable and indeed plethoric authority on this
subject, both case and commentary, pro and con.3 To
summarize, analyze, quote from and argue those volumes
would consume far more pages than this Court's rules
or time would allow, and thus we would rather analyze
a more specific question — "should the jury be blindfolded in Utah?"
We start with the proposition that, although Rule
49, Utah Rules of Court Procedure, no doubt allows
the use of special verdicts, the tradition in this State
has been essentially a tradition of general verdicts.
3 See, e.g. Badger v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 414 F.2d 880
(5th Cir. 1969); Wilson v. Benton, 476 S.W.2d 214 (Ark. 1972);
Chitwood v. Myers, 443 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1969); Thode, Comparative Negligence Contribution Among Tort-Feasors and the
Effect of a Release — A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature,
1973 Utah L. Rev. 406; Fine, Does the Trend in Our Substantive Law Dictate an Expanded Use of the Special Verdict?, 37
Albany L. Rev. 229 (1973); Flynn, Comparative Negligence:
the Debate, Trial 219 (May/June 1972); Guinn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 St. Mary's L.J. 175 (1970); Denton,
Informing a Jury of the Legal Effect of its Answer, 2 St. Mary's
L.J. 1 (1970); Green, The Submission of Special Verdicts in
Negligence Cases — A Critique of the Bug Bite Case, XVII
University of Miami L. Rev. 469 (1963); Bertelsman, Special
Verdicts and Interrogatories, 30 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 208
(1961).

12
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This Court has placed its imprimatur on that tradition.
In Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 164, 308 P . 2d 264,
267 (1957) the Court noted:
As heretofore observed, great care should be
taken to submit questions to the jury so that they
are as clear as possible. When a general verdict
will best settle the issues, it should be used. When
specific issues cannot be reached by a general verdict, the trial court should take advantage of
special verdicts or special interrogatories.
And in Barton v. Jensen, 19 Utah 2d 196, 199, 429 P .
2d 44, 46 (1967) four of the Justices adopted the following statement:
A majority of the members of the Court are of
the opinion that in cases such as this, which consist of simple negligence, where only two parties
are involved, it would be better practice to submit the case to the jury upon a general verdict.
I t appears that the best efforts of trial judges
to make interrogatories simple, concise and understandable still result in juries misunderstanding what is intended.
Justice Ellett, concurring in result, stated a preference
for special verdicts.
Likewise in Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, although there are provisions for the special
verdicts (R 49 (a)) and general verdicts accompanied
by answers to interrogatories (R 49 ( b ) ) , these matters
are left to the trial court's discretion and indeed, Rule
49(b) suggests that the jury should be advised as to
what it is doing and the significance of its answers:
13
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The Court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury
both to make answers to the interrogatories and
to render a general verdict, and the court shall
direct the jury both to make written answers and
to render a general verdict.
See also JIFU Section 1.11 which shows a typical use
of special verdict or interrogatories accompanied with
what is tantamount to general verdict.
We suggest that it has been the practice in the
State of Utah that the form and nature of interrogatories and verdicts submitted to a jury have been largely left to the discretion of the trial court depending
upon the nature of the case involved. Certainly, it is
the law generally that the form of submission to the
jury is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court. See, for example; 5 A Moore's Federal
Practice, § 49.03 [1] wherein the author observes:
Under Rule 49 (a) the court has complete discretion as to whether a special or general verdict
is to be returned. (Emphasis added.)
Thus the method of submission has typically been controlled by the philosophy and the discretion of the trial
judge, the nature of the case (i.e. in a complex, multiparty case the need for special interrogatories is perhaps more evident), and other similar factors.
The next question is whether there is anything
about the nature of comparative negligence itself which
suggests that we should deviate abruptly from the prior
practice in this State and deprive the trial courts of the
14
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discretion they have heretofore enjoyed. Professor
Thode, in his excellent article on comparative negligence
(1973 Utah Law Review 406, 414) asserts that section
38 of the Utah Law on Comparative Negligence (which
is virtually identical to the Idaho Statute) does not
require this result. H e notes in this respect:
Attempting to fit the statutory language into
the choices under Rule 49,1 find the only sensible
construction is that the trial judge must choose a
method of submission that directs the jury to
answer questions concerning the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The trial judge should be
allowed to choose the special verdict or general
verdict with interrogatories because either
method complies with the mandate of Section 38.
The quoted language from section 38, in my
judgment, cannot support the construction that
upon demand all issues must be decided upon
the basis of a special verdict submission to the
jury.
Even more so in the instant case, any mandate in the
Idaho statute which could arguably be construed as
requiring the blindfolding of the jury is clearly not controlling in view of the fact that such would be a "procedural" rather than a "substantive" provision and
therefore not applicable in the courts of Utah under the
choice of law doctrines discussed herein.
As further support for the proposition that there
is nothing about comparative negligence itself which
requires "blindfolding" the jury, we refer this Court to
15
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the numerous cases which have heretofore been decided
under F E L A . I t apparently has never occurred to
anyone in this State that there is anything wrong with
telling a jury what it was doing in a F E L A comparative negligence case. See, for example, JIFU instructions 81.1 and 81.3 which clearly advise the jury the
effect of its findings in a F E L A case. See also Bennett v. Denver <% Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 117 Utah 57, 213 P.2d 325, 332 (1950) wherein
Justice Wolfe, concurring, quite frankly acknowledged
that the jury may tend to average out the various factors in order to arrive at a just verdict.
I t is quite likely that the jury looks at these
cases realistically by determining what net
amount the plaintiff should receive to see him
decently through life and then makes the verdict
high enough so that its guess as to the amount
the plaintiff should be penalized for contributory
negligence when subtracted will bring the verdict
to the amount that they think he should receive.
Justice Wolfe expressed no shock or dismay at this
concept. I t would appear to be an erratic and discriminatory policy to fully advise a jury of the law in
F E L A "complete" comparative negligence cases but to
isolate them from that knowledge in "51-49" comparative negligence cases.
There are two basic facets to the question which
ought to be considered. First, on a philosophical level
one must decide whether the jury is to be entrusted
with knowledge of what it is doing or whether it should

16
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be scrupulously circumscribed and isolated. Certainly
reasonable minds can differ on this subject.
Professor Wigmore, Ezra Pound and Professor
Moore have all written on this subject and have each
advocated the "general verdict" approach. 4 Moore
(5A Moore's Federal Practice, §49.07 at 2235-36) puts
it as follows:
The jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific
fact finding body. Its chief value is that it applies the "law," oftentimes a body of technical
and refined theoretical principles and sometimes
edged with harshness, in an earthy fashion that
comports with "justice" as conceived by the
masses, for whom after all the law is mainly
meant to serve. The general verdict is the answer
from the man in the street.
On the polar side of this philosophical issue perhaps the
most quoted spokesmen are Carroll R. Heft and C.
James Heft who in Heft, Comparative Negligence
Manual, Section 8.10 (1971) state as follows:
The special verdict is the very cornerstone of the
comparative negligence concept, and the jury
does not, and should not, know the legal effect
and result of its answers to the interrogatories
on the special verdict.
By using the procedure of a special verdict under
comparative negligence, a jury finds the facts
without regard to the ultimate outcome of the
case. The court takes the facts as found by the
jury and awards judgment. The procedure is
4 Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 Am.
Jud. Soc'y. 166 (1929); and Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910).
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intended to ascertain the truth untainted by
prejudice or a desire to see one of the parties
win or lose.
I t probably ought to be observed, in fairness, that the
Hefts represent approximately twenty five insurance
companies ranging from The American Family Insurance Company to Western Casualty & Surety Company. (See 197 Martindale-Hubbell Law Dictionary,
Vol. IV, p. 3004B.)
In determining which approach is desirable, this
court might well consider whether there is any empirical support in Utah for the proposition that juries are
no longer worthy of the trust we have traditionally
placed in them. Has Utah experienced run-away plaintiff's verdicts? Have juries acted lawlessly in granting
verdicts to plaintiffs solely out of compassion? Do
juries disregard the trial court's instructions on the
law? We submit that this court is in an excellent position to evaluate the effectiveness of judge-jury funcioning in Utah and to determine if there is any truly
compelling reason now, for the first time, to significantly diminish the relative role of the jury in this state.
Aside from the purely philosophical considerations,
there are, of course, numerous pragmatic considerations
which this Court should consider:
How long can you keep juries blindfolded? I t
would seem that sooner or later people are going to find
out what the law of comparative negligence is and,
when they are asked to serve upon juries, they will
18
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apply that knowledge. The Colorado Court of Appeals, in deciding that the jury should be advised of
the affect of their findings upon the verdict noted:
The manner in which the law applies to a given
state of facts should not be a closely guarded
secret which is known only to judges and lawyers. It will, in fact, ultimately become known
to at least some members of the community who
will be asked to sit upon juries. It is far better
for courts to be the vehicle by which the operation of the law is explained than to rely upon
whatever chance understanding may come the
way of potential jurors. Simpson v. Anderson,
517 P.2d 416, 419 (Colo. App. 1973).
The possibility of affirmative injustice. The principal problem of not advising the jury as to the law
of comparative negligence is that it is quite likely the
jury will come to conclusions or assumptions which may
be affirmatively misleading. They may assume that the
plaintiff will recover but the damages will be reduced
proportionally (as in F E L A cases). They may assume
that in a fifty-fifty case, the plaintiff will recover fifty
percent, (which because of certain abuses with the 5149 type of statute, Wisconsin has now adopted as a
measure of recovery) or they might assume any number
of other possibilities. This problem has bothered various commentators on this subject. The Court of Appeals in Colorado noted in this respect:
A realistic approach requires that we recognize
the jury's will to anticipate the consequence of
their findings relative to percentage of negligence.
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under the Colorado Comparative Negligence
provision, which denies recovery to the plaintiff
found 50% negligent, there is a substantial possibility that a jury might misunderstand the consequences of its decision. Acknowledging that
jurors will anticipate the effect of their findings,
we believe it preferable for the jury to deliberate
with an understanding of the true effect of the
law rather than under possible misapprehensions.
Id. at 418.
Professor Thode shares this concern:
An instruction on the law of comparative negligence is especially needed because the absence of
such instruction may be affirmatively misleading. Absent such an instruction, a sensible juror
is likely to believe that the plaintiff will recover,
but that the damages will be reduced proportionally if plaintiff's contributory negligence is found
to be less than one hundred percent. Such an
assumption would be accurate in a "pure" comparative negligence state, but not in Utah where
the plaintiff's negligence must be less than the
defendant's negligence for plaintiff to recover
anything from that defendant. Thode, supra, at
417-418.
Inconsequentiality. Another problem which we believe is serious is that if the jury is not advised of the
consequences and impact of their answers to the interrogatories, they may well assume that the questions are
insignificant or unimportant. One author (William J .
Flynn in "Comparative Negligence: Debate," Trial
Magazine, 49, 51, May-June 1972) notes in this respect:
The percentage inquiry in a special question,
when posed without explanation, sounds incon20
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sequential and nonprobative unless the j u r y is
told how it does or does not result in a verdict,
and unless the j u r y is required to work out the
end-verdict in dollars themselves.
Juror Frustration.
Another highly important consideration is that service as a j u r o r is, for many people,
their only exposure to the judicial system. W e submit
that the performance of that duty will be frustrating
and promotive of distrust if the jurors are not trusted
with the consequences of their decisions. They should
know how a case comes out and not be required to resort to guess. The public, including jurors, is legally
presumed to know the law. I t certainly seems, therefore, that we should not attempt to hide it from them.
W e recognize that there will undoubtedly be cases
where it will be almost impossible to advise the j u r y of
the affect of their findings, particularly in complex,
multi-party litigation involving claims for indemnity,
contribution, counterclaims, etc. I n such cases, as has
been historically the case in this jurisdiction, the trial
j u d g e should continue to have discretion to utilize the
form of verdict which will best produre a j u s t result.
If that form of verdict happens to be a special verdict,
certainly the trial court should have that discretion. On
the other hand, we respectfully submit that the trial
court's discretion ought not to be circumscribed against
using interrogatories with a general verdict in comparative negligence cases. I n the instant case, after
living with the case, observing the results, and hearing
all relevant arguments, J u d g e Snow determined that
21
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the jury should have been told the affect of their findings and that the failure to do so resulted in a substantial injustice.
In conclusion, we commend the following discussion of this subject to the Court. I t represents the
views of two University of Texas law professors which
we think fairly summarize our position.
Why indeed should juries be denied the understanding of how their answers will affect the outcome of the case? Further, how successful are
the efforts of the judges to control the juror's
answers in favor of the party the juror thinks
should win? How can an intelligent person who
listens to what goes on in the courtroom go to
the jury room without having an opinion that
one of the parties should have his verdict? And
if he has a conviction, what can keep him from
voting his conviction whether he keeps quiet or
becomes an advocate for the answer he thinks will
support the judgment he desires? To ask him to
find the facts is to ask him to consider the outcome to which the facts contribute. There is no
such thing as findings facts in a vacuum—they
have meaning only when found with respect to
some objective. Since the juror cannot be kept
from considering the effect of his answer, why
should the attempt be made ?
We think that jury trial necessarily is based on
the assumption that a jury is entitled to have
all the aid the court can give in understanding
the law relevant to the controlling issues as they
are submitted. Any attempt to "hide the ball"
is beneath the dignity of a court and is a challenge
to the integrity of trial by jury. If the case is
tried before a judge sitting also as a jury, he
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has the benefit of the evidence and the law and
makes such findings supported by the evidence
as he conisders necessary to support the judgment he renders for one party or the other. In
all fairness to the parties and the jury, why
should the jury not have the benefit of all the
law and the relevant facts that a judge would
have in trying the case without a jury? The
only answer is fear of the jury.
Denying instructions to guide the jury in the
performance of its functions because of fear that
it may reach a judgment based on the layman's
sense of justice can hardly be called jury trial.
Green & Smith, Negligence, Law,
No-Fault,
and Jury Trial—I, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1093, 111315 (1972).
B.
In the event this court should rule that the jury
should not be advised as to the effect of its findings on
comparative negligence, the new trial should nonetheless be allowed in order to give a more appropriate instruction to the jury explaining the lack of relationship
between percentages of relative fault and damages.
As noted above, the trial court granted a new trial
on two grounds alternative in nature. First, the court
held that the jury should be advised on the law of
comparative negligence (R. 16). Secondly, pursuant
to a request in the motion for new trial and argument,
the court ruled alternatively as follows:
Alternatively, and in all events, the Court is of
the opinion that substantial justice has not been
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done in the present case. The jurors were not
sufficiently instructed as to the relationship, or
lack of relationship, between the percentage findings and the damages. Therefore, even if the
jury is not told the legal meaning of the percentages, it should be more specifically instructed
on how to answer the interrogatories. The jury
should be advised and instructed specifically that
there is no relationship between the damage
answer and the percentages. (R. 16)
This issue was not treated by the Appellant in its
brief, but it is certainly deserving of consideration by
this Court. If Utah is going to adopt the procedure of
not advising the jury of the affect of their percentage
answer, we must, as the corallary to that practice, adopt
what procedures and instructions are possible to minimize the possibility of the jury making unwarranted
assumptions. The only effort made by Judge Snow to
accomplish this in instructions submitted to the jury
in the instant case was contained in Question No. 4
of the Special Verdict. After asking about negligence,
and the percentages, question No. 4 asks about damages
as follows:
QUESTION NO. 4. Disregarding any of the
previous answers, what is the total amount of
damages sustained by plaintiff F . William McGinn I I as a result of the incident?
(a) General damages including lost
wages
$
(b) Special damages

$18,150.00
TOTAL

$
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The question is whether the first phrase, "disregarding
any of the previous answers", is sufficient to advise the
j u r y that there is to be no reduction iii damages based
upon the possible fault of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff may or may not be entitled to damages, even though
they are set forth by the j u r y , and that, in effect, they
should consider the damage question in the abstract.
I n arguing the new trial motion, plaintiff's counsel
suggested that an instruction comparable to that given
in Wisconsin should be given in the event that the
court determined the j u r y should not be advised of the
affect of its answers to the damage interrogatories. A
proposed insruction was tendered to the Court (R. 930).
T h a t instruction is set forth, in total, in a bulletin entitled Comparative Negligence Institute, dated December 14, 1973, sponsored by the U t a h State B a r Continuing Legal Education Committee, at page 67. I t is
a form instruction given in Wisconsin where the j u r y
is not advised of the effect of its answers to percentage
questions. The critical portions of that instruction as
they relate to the damage issue are as follows:
Y o u must answer the damage question no matter
how you have answered any of the previous questions in the verdict. B y asking you to determine
the amount of damages, the Court is not indicating, nor is it asking you to indicate that the
p a r t y whose damages are being determined is
entitled to them.
I n answering the damage question, you will disregard any percentages you may find or state in
answer to the comparative negligence question:
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any use or application of such percentages will
be for the Court to determine in directing judgment.
*

*

*

Nothing should be added by way of punishment
or because of sympathy or resentement [sic],
nor should anything be deducted by reason of
doubt of the liability of any of the defendants,
. ..5

The value of such an instruction is apparent. If
the jury is not to be told what the percentages mean,
they may be under the mistaken belief that the plaintiff will receive something inasmuch as the jury is
asked to determine what the damages are. If Utah is
going to "blindfold the jury" there are at least two
different ways to obviate this problem. The first, which
is not as satisfactory as informing the jury about the
law, is to give them a precautionary instruction such
as that set forth above. A second, and perhaps preferable if more cumbersome method, would be to have a
bifurcated submission whereby the jury would first determine the answer to the liability question and then,
only if necessary, retire to the jury room a second time
in order to determine the question of damages.
This phenomenon has not escaped literary comment. In Comparative Negligence: The Debate, Trial
Magazine, (May-June 1972), the author, William J .
Flynn, notes that one of the problems with not advising
the jury is:
5 Heft and Heft also recommend this instruction — Comparative
Negligence Manual, Section 7.550 (1970).
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An illusion is cultivated among the juiy that the
plaintiff is to be awarded something, merely because they have been instructed by the judge to
work out a damage evaluation—which means extended discussion in the jury, deliberation room
of physicians' testimony, future incapacitation,
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of living,
detailed medical special damages, loss of earnings past and future, and auto property damage.
Hours may thus be devoted by the jury to wrestling with these damage issues in the jury deliberation room, particularly where there was conflicting medical testimony or where the jury
members hold different views as to the extent
of damages.
This is a deceptive state of affairs calculated to
create miscarriage of justice. Id. at 50.
No matter how this Court decides the first issue
presented in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted
that it is critical this issue be decided in a way consistent
with Judge Snow's ruling on the motion for new trial.
There is a clear danger that the jury was uninformed
in this respect which may haw -iflVctcd their answers
to the percentage questions. If we are going to adopt
the "blindfolded" approach utilized in Wisconsin, we
should, as a necessary corollary adopt instructions developed over many years in Wisconsin including, specifically, "thai \- i-i"l Judge Snow found should have been
granted regarding the lack of relationship between the
percentages of fault and damages.
Thus, the order granting a new trial should be
sustained regardless of how the court answers the first
question presented on appeal.
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POINT I I
CROSS-APPEAL

BY

RESPONDENT

T H E T R I A L COURT C O M M U T E D P R E J U D I C I A L ERROR IN T H E COURSE OF
T H E T R I A L I N R E F U S I N G TO A D M I T
CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS.
Regardless of how this Court rules on the other
issues presented in this appeal, plaintiff nonetheless
submits that error was committed by the trial court in
excluding certain photographs from evidence and therefore that he is entitled to a new trial.
The exhibits in question are Exhibits 66p, 67p and
68p. Each of these is a photograph of the area in which
the accident occurred showing warning signs which were
placed on the beach subsequent to the accident in
question.
These pictures were offered in connection with the
testimony of a witness from Utah Power & Light Company, Mr. Daniel James Raymond, District Representative of the Montpelier, Idaho District which includes the subject area. Mr. Raymond testified that
he was familiar with warning signs such as that admitted as exhibit 58p (R. 794). H e further admitted
that those signs have been available for many years in
the Montpelier district, (Ibid). Mr. Raymond was
asked regarding the use of these signs in recreational
areas as follows:
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Q. As of J uly 1972 there was no particular reason why the signs could not have been placed on
that beach area west of Lifton, was there?
A, This did not pertain at all to the, anything
except for irrigation areas, these signs.
Q. Now I don't
that distinction.

T am not sure I quite catch

A . This sign there, it says, I believe it says, keep
the pipe horizontal. I t is strictly for an irrigation pipe that it shows in the picture. A n d it's
meant, I think, strictly for an irrigation area,
the sign. The bottom of the sign says, keep the
pipe horizontal.
Q. I see, and tha I: • :: i il/\
pipes ?

refers to irriga tion

::\ T h a t is what these were piil on! *or,--vs.
Q. I see. A n y other kind of pipe, you happen to
have that kind of pipe, you are j u s t not protected
by this sign, is that your policy?
A, These were sent out with the information that
they should be p u t around irrigation systems.
(R. 795-796.)
Based upon this testimony, plaintiff offered exhibits 66p through 68p for the purpose of demonstrating that signs, (identical to 5 8 p ) , could feasibly and
practicably be utilized for warning purposes in recreation areas. The jarv was excused from the 1*001 n and
if-

if-:

of j •< - ! :•; id'

villi respect t o these photos,

(R. 797). Plaintiff requested the photograph- be admitted with a
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[C]autionary instruction that they are not to be
considered as evidence of negligence of the defendant, but are offered for two purposes: Number
1, to show the practicality and ease with which
the signs could have been put up; Number 2, on
a question of impeachment of testimony of the
gentleman we just had on the stand. His testimony was that these signs were used only for
irrigation purposes. That is what they are for,
and so forth, and so on. This [referring to the
photographs] is evidence that they've been used
for recreational purposes and are just as good
for that as they are for irrigation. And thirdly,
we offer them on the trespass issue. (R. 797798.)
There was extensive argument on this subject, (R. 700
et seq), briefs were submitted, (R. 222 et seq), and the
court ultimately excluded evidence of defendant's subsequent sign posting on the beach area in question (R.
815).
The admission of these photographs should be controlled by Utah's newly adopted Rules of Evidence.
Rule 51 thereof provides as follows:
When after the occurrence of an event remedial
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if
taken previously would have tended to make the
event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event.
N O T E : This rule relates only to negligence and
not to causation. It is not intended to exclude
evidence which might be admissible on other
grounds independent of such provisions.
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This rule of evidence restates wha; has been recognized
by most courts as being the law of this subject. Sec
generally Annotation: Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken a Her
the accident, 64 A T E. 2d 1298.
In a number of eases, remedial measures in connection with electrocution incidents have been held admissible under a number of the exceptions to the general rule. In Cooper v. Heintz Manufacturing Company, 385 Pa. 296, 122 A.2d 699 (1956), evidence regarding a guard placed at a transformer tower following an electrocution incident was held admissible I'nr
the purpose of designating control over the instrumenality. To the same general effect see Houston Lighting <$ Power v. Tabor, 221 S.W. 2d 339 (Texas 1949).
In Johnson v. United States, 163 F . Supp. 388 (D.C.
Montana 1958), repairs to an electrical substation
barbed wire were held admissible "for the sole purpose
of showing the practicality of this additional safeguard."
Id. at 395. And in Hyadman v. Pennsylvania Railway
Company, 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251, it was held that
warning signs, placed after an injury on a transformer
tower, were admissible on the question of whether it
was practical for the defendant to take steps to further
guard the area.
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant
Power Company, having taken the position tha warning signs, such as exhibit 58p, were used "strictly' for
irrigation purposes, placed in issue the question of the
practicality of I itilizing such signs in other areas includ31
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ing the beach in question. Having placed the question
in issue, the Power Company should be estopped from
objecting to the admissibility of subsequent signs.
These signs do demonstrate that it was practicable,
feasible and perhaps effective to place warning signs
along the beach in question in such a way as to fairly
advise the visiting public of hidden dangers above.
It is further submitted that the error in excluding
these photographs was prejudicial to plaintiff. H a d
the jury been advised as to the practicality and feasibility of placing these signs in a recreation area and
had they not been led to believe that the signs were
"strictly" for irrigation purposes, they may well have
assessed a greater amount of negligence to the defendant and a lesser amount to the plaintiff.

POINT

III

T H E COURT E R R E D IN UNREASONABLY RESTRICTING T H E AREA OF PERM I S S I B L E C L O S I N G A R G U M E N T ON P E R CENTAGES.
If this Court should rule that the jury may be
advised of the affect of its percentage findings, there
is no need to consider this point. On the other hand,
if the court should rule that the Wisconsin practice of
blindfolding the jury is to be followed, then the Court
should consider this additional point since it does raise
an issue as to the proper scope of argument.
32
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The practice in W isconsin has been that, although
a jury is not advised as to the affect of its percentage
findings, counsel have been allowed to argue various
percentages without advising the jury as to what the
legal affect will be.
Apparently one trick that defense lawyers in Wisconsin have used is to argue that the parties are fiftyfifty responsible. This is recommended by Heft & Heft
in Comparative Negligence Manual, Section 6.50 as
follows:
The argument that both parties are equally at
fault is very effective in a close case. It compels
the plaintiff to "reach" and argue that the plaintiff is either not at fai lit at all, or is at fault in
a lesser degree.
Apparently, defense lawyers have utilized this technique extensively in Wisconsin, to such an extent that
Wisconsin finally amended its statute to provide that
the plaintiff recovers even though his negligence is fifty
percent. See Thode, supra., 406, 418 N. 41.
In the trial of this case Judge Snow, while preventing the parties informing the jury of the effect of
their findings, went further and stated that the parties
could not argue the percentages. The colloquy on this
subject commences at R, S"?n. Tin* tri:il jtidjfe finally
advised as follows:
I think each party can argue within legal bounds
that their own client is either not negligent at
all or very, very slight and that the other party
was grossly negligent or almost the only negli-
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gence, but no mention of the fact that the money
award depends on the degree. See what I mean?
Even like a ten-ninety or anything else. Stay
away from anything like that, and especially
don't even get near that fifty-fifty thing. (R.
817).

Although we do not commend the practice of the Wisconsin defense lawyers exploiting this type of argument, we do believe that if the jury is not to be instructed as to what the percentages mean, at bare minimum counsel ought to be allowed to fully argue various
percentages. In other words, we should not simply
adopt part of the Wisconsin rules and not others. I t
is extremely difficult to argue a case like this by using
words such as "great" or "small." Counsel should be
allowed to argue specific percentages including fifty
one-forty nine or fifty-fifty, or any other figures.
It is respectfully submitted that the failure to
allow that type of argument consitutes reversible error,
in the event this court should ultimately decide the jury
should be blindfolded.
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CON CI i C J SION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Judge Snow did
not abuse his inherent discretion in granting the new
trial in this proceeding. To a considerable degree, this
trial was an experimental one inasmuch as Judge Snow
was required to n ile i ipon v arioi is issues of first impression in this jurisdiction. Although his rulings were
considered and studied, we respectfully submit that his
final conclusion, that is that justice was not done, is well
supported and that a new trial should be granted. Before
that new trial is held, however, the rulings of this Court
are needed on critical issues: (1) Should the jury be
"blindfolded"—as to this matter we respectfully submit
that ]\r tradition V Vluh entrusting oir juries with
knowledge of the consequences of their action should
be continued; (2) Should more precise instructions be
given in the event the juries are "blindfolded"—as to
this issue we submit that Judge Snow's ruling on the
new trial motion is correct and that juries should be
given more careful instructions "than were provided In
the instant case to prevent injustice even f 'h- j<ir\ is
to I>e "blindfolded"; (3) On the evidentiary issue, v\ o
respectfully submit that in a close case (and this was
close) a ruling such as that questioned in point 2 of this
brief could well be prejudicial and therefore, the Court's
error in that respect should be, independently, ground
for a new trial J : I) Finally, the Court erred prejudicially us unduU restricting argument >>n percentages VJU] hence increased Hie confusion ^ the /jury
which, itself, is independent grounds for a new trial.
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It is respectfully submitted that a new trial be
ordered by the Court with the guidance of this Court on
the issues presented.
Dated this 6th day of September, 1974.
PARSONS, B E H L E & LATIMER
By JAMES B . L E E
D. FRANK W I L K I N S and
GORDON L. ROBERTS
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent-Cross Appellant
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